The 1979 Amendments to the Speedy Trial Act: Death of the Planning Process by Misner, Robert L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 3 Article 3
1-1981
The 1979 Amendments to the Speedy Trial Act:
Death of the Planning Process
Robert L. Misner
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Robert L. Misner, The 1979 Amendments to the Speedy Trial Act: Death of the Planning Process, 32 Hastings L.J. 635 (1981).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol32/iss3/3
The 1979 Amendments to the
Speedy Trial Act: Death of the
Planning Process
By ROBERT L. ISNER*
The Speedy Trial Act of 19741 (Act) endeavored to minimize
delay in criminal proceedings by mandating that criminal defen-
dants be tried within one hundred days after arrest or service of
summons, excluding certain periods of delay.2 Superficially, the
Act resembles most state speedy trial statutes.3 In actuality, the
Act is a major innovation in the field of criminal legislation be-
cause of its comprehensive planning provisions that are intended
to facilitate the transition to a speedier criminal justice system.4
The Act as adopted in 1974 provided that time limits for indict-
ment and trial of defendants were to be phased in during a four-
year program.5 During the phase-in period, when sanctions for fail-
ure to comply with the Act's time limits were not fully applicable,
the district courts were directed to experiment, critique, and plan
compliance efforts. The district courts were organized into groups
to gather data, comment on the substantive provisions of the Act,
and determine the resources needed to comply with the mandated
time requirements.6 In effect, Congress admitted that it needed the
assistance of local federal judges, magistrates, lawyers, clerks, and
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Professor of Law, Arizona State
University College of Law. B.A., 1968, University of San Francisco; J.D., 1971, University of
Chicago.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Id. § 3161.
3. For a discussion of state speedy trial statutes, see Poulous & Coleman, Speedy
Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 357 (1976)
4. For a general description of the bill, see H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-
28, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7401, 7414-21 [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 1508].
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3165-3168 (1976).
6. Id.
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probation officers in drafting a workable response to a serious
problem.
During the phase-in period, however, the majority of district
courts neglected their planning responsibilities and Congress ig-
nored even those few suggestions that the district courts did ad-
vance.7 Congress' disregard of the planning provisions of the Act
eventually led to the ill-advised amendments to the Speedy Trial
Act that became effective on August 2, 1979.8
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the inadequacies of
the three major 1979 amendments to the Act and to demonstrate
that the inadequacies of these amendments result from the failure
of Congress and the courts to make good faith efforts to implement
the planning provisions of the Act. The Article first examines the
substantive provisions of the Act as originally promulgated, noting
the areas that were amended in 1979. The Article then analyzes
the three major 1979 amendments, focusing on their impact on the
planning process. The Article concludes that bypassing the district
court planning groups may well sound the death knell for the plan-
ning process as envisioned by the drafters of the Act.
Provisions of the Act
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 required that from July 1, 1975,
to July 1, 1979, trials of all persons held in detention solely be-
cause they were awaiting trial had to commence no later than
ninety days following the beginning of continuous detention.9 The
amended Act continued these provisions through July 1, 1980. The
interim limits relating to the in-custody defendant merely served
to assure in-custody cases the highest priority in trial scheduling. 10
If the in-custody defendant was not tried within ninety days, he or
she was to be released.11 After July 1, 1979, both the original and
7. See Misner, District Court Compliance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 1977
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 15-25.
8. Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat. 327 (1979) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (1976).
10. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REVISED MODEL
STATEMENT OF TIME LIMIT AND PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL
CASES 2 (Speedy Trial Directive No. 11, Feb. 18, 1976).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) (1976). Whether the computation of the 90-day period can take
into account the excludable time provisions of § 3161(h) remains unresolved. The Adminis-
trative Conference has taken the position that the exclusions do not apply to the in-custody
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amended versions of the Act mandate that criminal defendants be
tried within one hundred days after arrest or service of summons,
excluding certain limited periods of delay.12 The amendments also
retained the provisions of the Act establishing experimental service
agencies1" to be governed by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to provide support and supervisory services
to noncustodial defendants awaiting trial.
1 4
The original Act divided the maximum one hundred day
period between arrest and trial into three segments: a thirty-day
limit between arrest and the filing of an indictment or informa-
tion, 15 a ten-day limit between the filing of an indictment or infor-
mation and arraignment, 6 and a sixty-day limit between arraign-
ment and trial. This division of the one hundred day period,
however, was not to become effective until the fifth year after the
passage of the Act; during the five year phase-in period, the time
standard varied.1 8 The 1979 amendments retain the one hundred
day limit but divide the one hundred days into only two periods: a
thirty-day limit between arrest and the filing of an indictment or
information,' and a seventy-day limit between the filing of an in-
dictment or information and trial.2 0
defendant during the interim period. See The Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1979:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.961 & S.1028, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 290, 330 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings 1979]. The Justice Department
has taken the contrary position. See id. at 700-01. In the first case dealing with the issue,
the Ninth Circuit held that the excludable time provisions are not applicable to the in-
custody defendant. United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976). Other courts,
however, have not followed the Ninth Circuit's lead. See, e.g., United States v. Corley, 548
F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Mejias, 417 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Masko, 415 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
13. The individual districts that have been chosen as experimental districts are: Dis-
trict of Maryland, Eastern District of Michigan, Western District of Missouri, Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Central District of California, Northern
District of Georgia, Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of New York, and North-
ern District of Texas. For a discussion of the pretrial service agencies, see ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION Op TITLE I AND
TTLE II OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL Acr OF 1974, at 25-44 (1976).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3155 (1976).
15. Id. § 3161(b) (1976).
16. Id. § 3161(c) (repealed 93 Stat. 327 (1979)).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 3161(f)-(g).
19. Id. § 3161(b).
20. Id. § 3161(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
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Time periods can be tolled by the "excludable time" provi-
sions of section 3161 (h), which somewhat mitigate the apparent
stringency of the Act.2 The Act specifically excludes delay result-
ing from physical and mental examinations, trials on other charges,
interlocutory appeals, hearings on pretrial motions, and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure, 40 transfers, from the statutory time
limits. 22 The Act also recognizes other exclusions, such as delays
owing to deferred prosecution to allow the defendant to demon-
strate good behavior, the absence of defendants and witnesses, and
other procedural difficulties.2 s The Act contains an escape clause
that permits the court to delay the trial if, by granting the continu-
ance, the ends of justice "outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial. '24 The possibility of using this
exception to circumvent the operation of the Act forbids granting
such a delay unless the court sets forth its reasons on the record
for doing SO. 2 5 The factors that the court must consider
are: whether a miscarriage of justice would likely result if the con-
tinuance were not granted; whether the nature of the case is such
that adequate preparation cannot be expected within the statutory
time limits; and whether the delay is caused by the complexity of
the case before the grand jury.28 The Act specifically states, how-
ever, that general court congestion, lack of diligent preparation by
the government, or failure of the government to obtain an available
witness are not grounds for delay.27
The 1979 amendments made a number of changes in the
calculation of excludable time. The two major changes in the
excludable time provisions are the amendments to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1)(F) and to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B). The first
amendment deems excludable all time from the filing of any pre-
21. For a discussion of the effect of the 1979 amendments upon the calculation of
excludable time, see text accompanying notes 117-28 infra.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (Supp. III 1979).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of the types of delay
envisioned by Congress to fall within the ends of justice exclusion, see H.R. REP. No. 1508,
supra note 4, at 39-41; Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Amended Guide-
lines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 18-21 (1975); Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Amended Guidelines to the Administration of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 22C-22G (1976).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (1976).
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trial motion through the hearing or disposition of the motion.2 8
The second amendment states that continuity of counsel for both
the defendant and the government is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the ends of justice require that a continuance
be granted.29 Minor changes were made in other subparagraphs of
section 3161(h)(1),30 and new paragraphs were added to cover
deferral of prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 2902,31 transportation of
defendants,32 and consideration of proposed plea agreements. 33
The amended Act not only retains the sweeping escape clause
found in the judicial emergency provision from the original Act,"
but also gives the chief judge of the district court the authority to
suspend the time limits of the Act for a period not to exceed thirty
days if the need for such suspension is "of great urgency."35 In cer-
tain circumstances the judicial council of the circuit is authorized
to suspend the time limits for a period not to exceed one year.3 6
Sanctions during the phase-in period were limited to releasing
those persons being detained solely to await trial and to reviewing
the conditions of release for defendants who were not tried within
ninety days after being designated as "high risk. '3 7 After July 1,
1980, more severe sanctions became effective:38 upon motion of the
28. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) provides that: "(h) The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed,
or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence: (1) Any
period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, included but not
limited to .... (F) delay resulting from any pretrial motion from the filing of the motion
through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion ....
"Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (Supp. 11 1979).
29. Section 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) provides that- "(B) The factors, among others, which a
judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph in any case are as follows: .... (iv) Whether the failure to grant such a
continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall
within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unrea-
sonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel
for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for
effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence." Id. §
3161(h)(8)(B)(iv).
30. Compare id. § 3161(h)(1)(E) (1976) with id. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (Supp. III 1979).
31. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(C) (Supp. 1I 1979).
32. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(H).
33. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(I).
34. "Judicial emergency" is the term used by the Act itself. Id. § 3174.
35. Id. § 3174(e).
36. Id. § 3174(b).
37. Id. § 3164.
38. Id. § 3163(c).
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defendant, the court may dismiss the complaint, information, or
indictment against the individual with or without prejudice.3 9 The
defendant's failure to move for dismissal prior to trial or plea con-
stitutes a waiver of his or her right to a dismissal.40 Moreover,
sanctions are provided against attorneys who intentionally delay
the proceedings.41
The planning provisions of the Act are of paramount impor-
tance. The Act, as it became law in 1975, assumed that its substan-
tive provisions were workable, but gave the district courts a five-
year period in which to comment on the substantive provisions and
to determine the resources needed to comply with the mandated
time limits. 42 The House Report emphasized this aspect of the law
when it stated:
The heart of the speedy trial concept ... is the planning process.
These provisions recognize the fact that the Congress-by merely
imposing uniform time limits for the disposition of criminal cases,
without providing the mechanism for increasing the resources of
the courts and helping to initiate criminal justice reform which
would increase the efficiency of the system-is making a hollow
promise out of the Sixth Amendment. s
Similar characterizations of the Act can be found in the Senate
Report,4 4 the House hearings,45 the House debate,46 and the Senate
39. Id. § 3162(a)(1) (1976).
40. Id. § 3162(a)(2).
41. Sanctions are detailed in § 3162(b): "In any case in which counsel for the de-
fendant or the attorney for the Government (1) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial
without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial; (2) files a
motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(3) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining a continuance which he knows to be
false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or (4) otherwise willfully fails to
proceed to trial without justification consistent with section 3161 of this chapter, the court
may punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows: (A) in the case of an appointed de-
fense counsel, by reducing the amount of compensation that otherwise would have been
paid to such counsel pursuant to section 3006 of this title in an amount not to exceed 25 per
centum thereof; (B) in the case of a counsel retained in connection with the defense of a
defendant, by imposing on such counsel a fine of not to exceed 25 per centum of the com-
pensation to which he is entitled in connection with his defense of such defendant; (C) by
imposing on any attorney for the Government a fine of not to exceed $250; (D) by denying
any such counsel or attorney of the Government the right to practice before the court con-
sidering such case for a period of not to exceed 90 days; or (E) by filing a report with an
appropriate disciplinary committee. The authority to punish provided for by this subsection
shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to such court." Id. § 3162(b).
42. See notes 5, 18 & accompanying text supra.
43. H.R. REP. No. 1508, supra note 4, at 23.
44. "The overall function of S. 754 is to encourage the Federal criminal justice system
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
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debate.47 The planning process of the Act thus makes it unique in
the annals of criminal justice legislation. The bypass of the plan-
ning process evidenced by the amendments has created a potential
nightmare for the federal courts and may eviscerate the utility of
the Act.
Amendments to the Act
The 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act contain three
major provisions:48  (1) a thirty-day minimum period to trial from
the date on which the defendant first appears in answer to a
charge;49 (2) the exclusion, for the purposes of the mandated time
limits, of all time from the filing of a motion through the disposi-
to engage in comprehensive planning and budgeting toward the goal of achieving speedy
trial. The most widely known section of the bill is the first section which imposes the time
limits. However, the most important sections of the bill are the planning process sections
(sections 3165-69) which provide a planning process whereby each district court formulates
a plan for the implementation of speedy trial and sets out the additional resources necessary
to meet the limits of section 3161.. . . The planning process sections are critical to the bill's
success because they provide the vital link between the Federal criminal justice system and
the appropriations process. In summary they provide the courts and the United States At-
torneys with a mechanism to plan for the implementation of 90-day trials in a systematic
manner, to try innovative techniques on a pilot basis, to itemize the additional resources
necessary to achieve the 90-day trial goal, and to communicate with Congress concerning its
plans and the additional budget requests." S. REP. No. 93-1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45
(1974).
45. In the House hearings on the Act, Senator Ervin commented: "I believe, after
years of studying this problem, that S. 754 can begin to end this seemingly hopeless morass.
The bill is based upon the premise that the courts, undermanned, starved for funds, and
utilizing 18th century management techniques, simply cannot cope with burgeoning
caseloads. The consequence is delay and plea bargaining. The solution is to create initiative
within the system to utilize modem management techniques and to provide additional
resources to the courts where careful planning so indicates." Speedy Trial Act of 1974:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, on S. 754,
H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658, H.R. 687, H.R. 773 & H.R. 4807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 158
(1974).
46. In the House debate Representative Cohen stated, "[tihe most important provi-
sions of this bill concern the process by which the district courts shall study the problems of
pretrial delay and plan for the implementation of the act's time limits." 120 CONG. REc. 41,
775 (1974).
47. See, e.g., id. at 24,660.
48. Other amendments include: merger of the second and third intervals providing for
a single 70-day period from indictment to trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979);
changes in the factors for the ends of justice continuances, id. § 3161(h)(8); minor changes
regarding high risk defendants, id. § 3164(a)-(b); and changes in the judicial emergency pro-
visions, id. § 3174. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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tion of the motion; 50 and (3) the delay from July 1, 1979, to July 1,
1980, of the imposition of sanctions for delay.51 The sanctions of
the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 were to become fully effective on July
1, 1979. Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, how-
ever, were under strong pressure from the Department of Justice52
and the American Bar Association" (ABA) to delay the implemen-
tation of sanctions or at least to alter the Act significantly. The
Judicial Conference of the United States Courts also proposed
some modifications of the original provisions of the Act." Despite
this pressure, the Senate did not hold hearings until May 2, 1977, 55
and the House waited until June 28, 1979.56 Both Committees
knew that unless they acted immediately the sanctions of the Act
would become fully effective.57 Congress responded to this pressure
by passing a hasty and ill-conceived set of amendments to the
Speedy Trial Act.
The fundamental purpose of the planning provisions of the
Act was to assure that amendments would be considered judi-
ciously during the four year phase-in period. The purpose of the
long phase-in period was to establish the local federal district
courts as the primary initiators of change. The planning provisions
constitute imaginative legislation and the poorly drafted amend-
ments reemphasize the invaluable contribution these novel pro-
visions could have made in effectuating the Act's purpose in guar-
anteeing the right to a speedy trial.
Thirty-Day Minimum to Trial
In an apparent attempt to guarantee that the Act did not be-
come the "Speedy Convictions Act,"5 8 the Justice Department,59
50. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
51. Id. § 3163(c).
52. See Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 31 (statement of Assistant United
States Attorney General Philip B. Heyman).
53. See id. at 482-509.
54. See id. at 56-69 (statement of Judge Alexander Harvey II, Chairperson, Committee
on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference).
55. See id. at 16.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 96-390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 805, 810-11 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 96-390].
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c) (1976).
58. See Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 115 (statement of Salvatore R.
Martoche).
59. The Justice Department was the author of S. 961, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
reprinted in Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 4-8.
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the Judicial Conference, 0 and the ABA61 all urged a waivable min-
imum time limit before which a defendant could not be tried. The
avowed reason for this amendment was to ensure that a defendant
has adequate time for pretrial preparation. 2 Lurking in the back-
ground of this amendment, however, was the underlying sentiment
of the private criminal defense bar that its attorneys needed a de-
terminate period of time before trial so that their clients could
make arrangements to pay legal fees.
6 3
The minimum time to trial concept is found in amendments to
section 3161(c)(2): "Unless the defendant consents in writing to
the contrary, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days
from the date on which the defendant first appears through coun-
sel or expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se."" Al-
though this clause seems straightforward, in the rush to pass the
amendments Congress left unanswered a crucial question as to
whether the excludable time provisions of section 3161(h) apply to
the thirty-day period or whether the thirty-day period is measured
simply in calendar days.
The administrative burden in monitoring the time limits im-
posed by the Act would be greatly increased if excludable time is
applicable to the thirty-day minimum to trial provision. 5 A more
60. The Judicial Conference was the author of S. 1028, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
reprinted in Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 9-15.
61. Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 486-95.
62. See, e.g., id. at 91 (statement of Professor Daniel J. Freed); id. at 115 (statement
of Salvatore R. Martoche).
63. See id. at 491 (American Bar Association memorandum).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (Supp. II 1979).
65. One of the most beneficial results of the Act has been the improvement in court
calendar management by the clerks. See Mann, The Speedy Trial Act Planning Process, in
Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 628. Innovations such as computer docketing have
made the courts more efficient. See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, Section IV (1980). The clerks have
centered their management responsibilities around keeping the judges informed of the latest
date a defendant can be tried. Id. The process of continually updating 400-500 pending
criminal cases to guarantee that no case exceeds a time limit, while still allowing for civil
cases to be scheduled and tried, presents a significant logistical problem for the clerks. If
excludable time is applicable to the thirty-day minimum to trial provision the clerk has an
additional burden; the clerk would not only have to monitor for maximum time limits, but
for minimum time limits as well. To further complicate the problem, the thirty-day mini-
mum period is determined from a different starting time than that for the running of time
from arrest to indictment or indictment to trial. The time to indictment is measured from
the date on which an individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with
the charge. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976). The time to trial is measured from the date that the
information or indictment is filed and made public, or from the date the defendant has
January 1981] SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
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significant practical problem can arise with respect to whether
hearings on motions and trials can be scheduled closely together so
that the prosecution can avoid the expense and inconvenience of
requiring out-of-town witnesses to make multiple trips in order to
testify at both the hearings and the trial. Such circumstances are
illustrated in the following hypothetical. Suppose the defendant
makes his or her first appearance on a drug charge on March 1. On
March 3 counsel files a motion to suppress certain evidence. Trial
is set for April 1 and the hearing on the motion to suppress is set
for March 30. The suppression hearing and the trial are set close
together in order that out-of-town witnesses can conveniently tes-
tify at both the hearing and the trial. Defendant's motion to sup-
press is denied. If excludable time is applicable to section
3161(c)(2), the time from the filing of the motion until the sup-
pression hearing is excludable under section 3161(h)(1)(f). Because
the defendant cannot be forced to trial before April 29, the defen-
dant has a new advantage with which to negotiate-the expense
and inconvenience of the witnesses' second trip.
A careful examination of the legislative history of the thirty-
day minimum to trial amendment is ambiguous as to the applica-
bility of excludable time. The question probably would not have
arisen had the amendments either been generated at the district
court level and forwarded to Congress or if the proposed amend-
ments had been circulated to the district court planning groups for
comment. Congress violated the spirit of the planning provisions
and complicated the Act needlessly when it bypassed the local
planning groups in enacting the 1979 amendments. The very recog-
nition that practical problems could not be anticipated by Con-
gress led to the inclusion of planning provisions in the original
Act.6 6 The failure to use the planning provisions will exacerbate
administrative difficulties and encourage litigation. To fathom
whether excludable time applies to the thirty-day minimum to
trial period, cumbersome analysis cannot be avoided. To determine
the applicability of the excludable time provisions of section
3161(h) to the thirty-day minimum to trial period, the following
analysis thus will consider the statutory language, the legislative
appeared before the court on the pending charge, whichever date last occurs. Id. §
3161(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). The thirty-day minimum period runs from the date.on which
the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects to pro-
ceed pro se. Id. § 3161(c)(2).
66. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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history, the noncongressional sources of the legislation, and finally
the policy underlying the provisions.
Analysis of the Statutory Language
The Act, as amended, does not explicitly declare whether ex-
cludable time is applicable to the thirty-day minimum to trial pe-
riod.67 Yet sections 3161(d)6 ' and 3161(e),6 9 both amended in 1979,
directly refer to the applicability of excludable time. Both sections
conclude with the language: "The periods of delay enumerated in
section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations
specified in this section."70 Moreover, the thirty-day minimum to
trial provision contained in section 3161(c)(2) is the only major
provision within section 3161 to which excludable time has not
been made explicitly applicable either through the clause in sec-
tion 3161(h) or through a precise statement of applicability as in
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (Supp. m1 1979). See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d) (Supp. II 1979) states: "If any indictment or information is
dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint filed
against an individual is dismissed or otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed
against such defendant or individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based
on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indict-
ment is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of subsection (b) and (c)
of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent complaint, indictment, or
information, as the case may be. (2) If the defendant is to be tried upon an indictment or
information dismissed by a trial court and reinstated following an appeal, the trial shall
commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the trial becomes final,
except that the court retrying the case may extend the period for trial not to exceed one
hundred and eighty days from the date the action occasioning the trial becomes final if the
unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from the passage of time shall make
trial within seventy days impractical. The periods of delay enumerated in section 3161(h)
are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section. The sanctions of
section 3162 apply to this subsection." Id. § 3161(d).
69. Section 3161(e) states: "If the defendant is to be tried again following a declara-
tion by the trial judge of a mistrial or following an order of such judge for a new trial, the
trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the retrial
becomes final. If the defendant is to be tried again following an appeal or a collateral attack,
the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the re-
trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend the period for retrial
not to exceed one hundred and eighty days from the date the action occasioning the retrial
becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time
shall make trial within seventy days impractical. The periods of delay enumerated in'section
3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section. The sanc-
tions of section 3162 apply to this subsection." Id. § 3161(e).
70. See notes 68-69 supra.
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section 3161(d) or section 3161(e). 1
Section 3161(b)72 of the original Act and amended section
3161(c) (1),73 however, are not expressly limited by the excludable
time provisions, although excludable time applies to them through
the clause in section 3161(h). Hence section 3161(c)(2) is unclear as
to the applicability of excludable time, and other provisions of the
Act must be examined.
On their face, the provisions of the Act that prescribe sanc-
tions favor a conclusion that excludable time does apply to the
thirty-day minimum to trial period. Section 3162 creates sanctions
"[i]f a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit re-
quired by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h)." 74 This
arguably implies that excludable time is applicable to all time
limits contained in section 3161. Section 3161(e) also may be read
to imply that excludable time applies to the thirty-day minimum
to trial period. Subsection (e) is the last provision within section
3161 that concerns the final 1980 time limits; the 1979 amend-
ments appended the following provisions to it: "The periods of de-
lay enumerated in section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the
time limitations specified in this section. The sanctions of section
3162 apply to this subsection. 7 5 This language suggests that the
excludable time provision found in section 3161(h) was intended to
apply to all of section 3161. The legislative history, however, only
compounds the ambiguity of what the term "subsection" refers to,
and leads to no firm conclusion.
76
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. III 1979).
72. Section 3161(b) states: "Any information or indictment charging an individual
with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which
such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If
an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no grand jury has been in
session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be
extended an additional thirty days." Id. § 3161(b) (1976).
73. Section 3161(c)(1) states: "In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the
trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an
offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial
officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. If a defen-
dant consents in writing to be tried before a magistrate on a complaint, the trial shall com-
mence within seventy days from the date of such consent." Id. § 3161(c) (Supp. IH 1979).
74. Id. § 3162(h) (1976).
75. Id. § 3161(e) (Supp. III 1979).
76. The most cogent reason for the appearance of the word "subsection" as opposed to
"section" seems to relate to S. 961, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Senate Hear-
ings 1979, supra note 11, at 4-8. See text accompanying note 66 supra. The amendments are
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The sanction provisions seem to be aimed largely, if not exclu-
sively, at the trial that is proceeding too slowly. For example, the
primary sanction for failing to bring a defendant to trial within the
seventy-day limit is found in section 3162(a)(2):
If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit...
the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the
defendant .... In determining whether to dismiss the case with
or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each
of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts
and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the
impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter
and on the administration of justice.77
The source of the original Act's sanctions provision is found in the
case law predating the Act.78 The cases involving speedy trial
issues79 were all concerned with trials being conducted long after
the defendant's arrest. Trials conducted so swiftly as to preclude
adequate preparation were not viewed as a speedy trial issue but
rather as a question of whether the defendant had been accorded
his or her right to effective assistance of counsel.80 It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the sanction provisions of the Act were only
framed in terms of those cases that took too long to proceed to
trial.
The attorney sanctions of section 3162 offer similar guidance.
The sanctions for attorneys are imposed when an attorney sets a
case for trial knowing that a witness is unavailable, files a motion
solely for purposes of delay, makes a false statement to gain a con-
tinuance, or fails to proceed to trial."1 The obvious intent of the
very confusing in determining whether the word "section" is referring to the section of the
original Act or to a section of the bill to amend the Act. For example, § 4 of S. 961 amends
§ 3161(e) of the Act. The ambiguity arises as to whether the word "section" in the state-
ment of S. 961, "[t]he sanctions of section 3162 are applicable to this section," id. § 4,
means § 4 of S. 961 or § 3161(e) of the original Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1976). It may very
well be that a congressional staff member tried and failed to clear up this ambiguity.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1976).
78. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 525 (1975). For a detailed summary of the case law subsequent to Barker v. Wing,, 407
U.S. 514 (1972), see Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo in the Lower
Courts, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 11 (1975).
79. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
80. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). See also Bazelon, The Defective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4.1 (1971).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (1976).
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section is to prevent delay. The attorney sanctions, just as the dis-
missal sanction, were not drafted to accommodate the trial that is
moving too swiftly. Although it might reasonably be argued that
the sanctions of section 3162(a)(2) operate whenever "a defendant
is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section
3161(c) as extended by 3161(h),' 82 it is clear from the wording of
the sanction provisions, and from their legislative history,83 that
they are inappropriate when directed at the trial that is running
too swiftly. The applicability of excludable time to the thirty-day
minimum period thus cannot be determined by reference either to
the provision establishing the thirty-day minimum or to the provi-
sions regarding sanctions. Consequently, the legislative history
must be examined.
Analysis of the Legislative History
The Senate hearings8  and the Housee5 and Senate reports"6
on the amendments contain little discussion of the thirty-day min-
imum to trial period. The sparse information in the Senate Report,
however, does address the issue directly:
Prohibiting trial less than 30 days after the date the defendant
appears in a position to begin preparing his defense more fully
protects basic due process rights. It is the Committee's intent
that the exclusions provided in section 3161(h) apply to the 30-
day minimum to trial provision. Therefore, if an event occurs
which would automatically exclude time under subsection (h),
such as a pretrial mental examination, that time is not only ex-
cluded from computing the time within which trial must occur
prior to imposition of the dismissal sanctions, but time would also
automatically be excluded in computing the 30-day minimum
period of time, during which the judge could not schedule trial
without the defendant's consent.8 7
82. Id. § 3162(a)(2).
83. H.R. REP. No. 1508, supra note 4, at 36-37.
84. Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11.
85. H.R. REP. No. 96-390, supra note 56.
86. S. REP. No. 96-212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
87. Id. at 32. "Having said that, the Committee wishes to stress that this minimum-
preparation time guarantee is not to be construed to permit the defendant to delay unduly
the trial date, especially where permissible excludable delay is found. If, for example, coun-
sel for the defedant [sic] moves for an "ends of justice" continuance under section
3161(h)(8) to allow him or her additional time to prepare for trial, the court should scruti-
nize closely his or her good-faith efforts to prepare inside the time fixed for trial, taking into
account other excludable delays. Again, the court should take great care to balance the de-
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This statement stands alone in the Senate Report; no similar re-
marks appear in the Senate hearings, 85 the House Report, 9 or in
the floor debates of either the House" or the Senate.9 1 These omis-
sions cast doubt upon the authority of the statement in the Senate
Report. Resort to noncongressional sources does not alleviate the
confusion.
Analysis of the Noncongressional Sources
In November of 1978 the Second Circuit's Proposed Guide-
lines under the Speedy Trial Act 92 were published. s Through its
proposed guidelines, the Second Circuit attempted to create a set
of standards for interpreting the Act "that both satisfies the pur-
poses of the Act and takes into account the legitimate needs of the
parties for counsel of their choice, reasonable notice of trial and
reasonable time to prepare for trial. '94 To further these goals the
proposed guidelines stated:
[W]henever the time between arraignment and the scheduled
trial date, exclusive of excluded time, does not exceed thirty (30)
days, the Court shall (a) view a request for an adjournment of
trial to a date within the sixty (60) day statutory limit, liberally
and (b) where such a request is denied, set forth its reasons for
finding that the denial of the adjournment does not interfere with
the defendant's or Government's choice of counsel, the defen-
dant's ability to prepare for trial without undue pressure, or the
Government's ability to diligently prepare for trial.9 5
However, the guidelines as ultimately approved by the Judicial
Council of the Second Circuit on January 16, 1979, read: "when-
ever the time between arraignment and the scheduled trial date
does not exceed thirty (30) days,"96 omitting the phrase "exclusive
fendant's and society's speedy trial rights against the "ends of justice" to be served by
granting such a motion." Id.
88. Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11.
89. H.R. RaP. No. 96-390, supra note 56.
90. 125 CONG. REC. H 6,911-16 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
91. Id. at S 8,009-26 (daily ed. June 19, 1979).
92. Judicial Council Speedy Trial Act Coordinating Committee of the Second Circuit,
Proposed Guidelines Under the Speedy Trial Act (Nov. 20, 1978).
93. Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 91 (statement of Professor Freed).
94. Judicial Council Speedy Trial Act Coordinating Committee of the Second Circuit,
Proposed Guidelines under the Speedy Trial Act (Nov. 20, 1978).
95. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
96. Judicial Council of the Second Circuit, Judicial Council Speedy Trial Act Coordi-
nating Committee, Second Circuit Speedy Trial Act Guidelines (Jan. 16, 1979), reprinted in
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It might be inferred from the deletion of the phrase "exclusive
of excludable time" from the proposed guidelines that excludable
time would apply under the final guidelines. This understanding
might then be attributed to the drafters of the Justice Depart-
ment97 and Judicial Conference Bills, 8 but with little justification.
The issue of excludable time and its effect upon the thirty-day pe-
riod were of minimal importance in the Second Circuit, so the leg-
islature would probably not rely upon that Circuit's guidelines.99
Additional noncongressional sources of information concerning
the applicability of the excludable time provisions to the thirty-
day minimum to trial period are the interpretations of the Act
published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and sent to all the districts. The Act empowers the Administrative
Office to assist the districts in implementing the Act.100 Unfortu-
nately, the Administrative Office has taken conflicting positions on
the applicability of section 3161(h) to the thirty-day minimum to
trial provision in section 3161(c)(2). In Issuance Number 28, dated
August 3, 1979, the Administrative Office stated without comment
that "[t]he report of the Senate committee indicates that the ex-
clusions are to be applied in calculating the thirty-day period."' 0'1
Issuance Number 30, however, states that the thirty-day minimum
is not extended by the exclusions of section 3161(h).102 Although it
Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 392-93.
97. See S. 961, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Senate Hearings 1979, supra
note 11, at 4-8.
98. See S. 1028, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Senate Hearings 1979,
supra note 11, at 9-15.
99. The trial judges of the districts within the Second Circuit could move quickly to
trial within 30 days from arraignment, whether it was 30 calendar days or 30 days excluding
time concerned in § 3161(h), if the trial judge had good reason to move ahead so rapidly. In
fact with the congestion in most courts, it was highly unlikely that there was a problem of
moving to trial too quickly. For the statistics on the caseload, time to indictment, and time
to trial for the district courts of the Second Circuit, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, FouRTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at A-3 to A-4, B-3 to B-4, C-3 to C-4 (June 28, 1979).
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3170-3171 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
101. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Issuance No. 28, at 2 (August
3, 1979).
102. "In spite of language to the contrary in the report of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on the 1979 amendments (S. Rept. 96-212, p. 32 (1979)), it is the view of this Com-
mittee that the thirty-day minimum period for commencement of trial is not extended by
the exclusions of Section 3161(h). Section 3161(h) applies by its terms to 'computing the
time within which the trial of any such offense must commence,' language that is not easily
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might be argued that the earlier issuance by the Administrative
Office was merely an early warning to the district courts and was
not intended to be interpretative, at the very least it can be said
that those close to the legislative process were not clear as to what
was intended and did not contradict the Senate Report.108 If the
problem's solution had been the source of any publicity or consid-
eration, such reference would have been placed within the earlier
issuance.
Finally, it should be noted that the Senate relied upon the
ABA for guidance in amending the Act.10 4 The ABA Section on
Criminal Justice reported to the ABA Board of Governors a num-
ber of recommended amendments to the Act.10 5 Among these pro-
posed amendments was one recommending that "trial of a defen-
dant shall not commence within 30 days of the filing of an
indictment or information without the defendant's consent." 08
However, no references were made in the ABA Report to the appli-
cability of excludable time to the thirty-day period.
The Act itself and the legislative history of the amendments
thus do not supply an answer to the question of whether the ex-
cludable time provisions of section 3161(h) apply to the'thirty-day
minimum to trial period of section 3161(c)(2). The avowed policy
underlying the thirty-day period amendment does not make the
issue any less problematic.
read as governing the determination of the period during which trial may not commence.
The 1979 amendments specifically provided in Sections 3161(d)(2) and (e) that the exclu-
sions applied to those provisions, but no similar provision is found in Section 3161(c)(2).
Moreover, if the thirty-day minimum were interpreted as subject to the exclusions, the pro-
vision would become a powerful weapon for defendants who wanted to delay their prosecu-
tions, a result that is wholly at odds with the major purpose of the statute. Under such an
interpretation, the court could be compelled to defer a trial simply because the defendant
filed a motion or because the court took a pretrial matter under advisement-both events
that trigger periods of excludable time under Section 3161(h)(1)." Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
Issuance No. 30, at 12-13 (December 14, 1979).
103. At both the Senate and House hearings, Mr. Anthony Partridge of the Federal
Judicial Center and Mr. Norbert Halloran of the Administrative Office were present. Their
presence at the Senate Hearings is documented in Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at
56. Their presence at the House Hearings was noted by the author, who appeared as a wit-
ness. See H.R. REP. No. 96-390, supra note 56, at 7.
104. For a statement of the ABA's recommendations, see Senate Hearings 1979, supra
note 11, at 482-509.
105. Id. at 486-95.
106. Id. at 492.
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Analysis of the Policy Underlying the Amendment
The stated purpose of the thirty-day minimum to trial period
is to guarantee that the defendant has adequate time to prepare
before trial.10 7 Had the thirty-day proposal been circulated to the
district court planning groups for comment, the districts would al-
most certainly have responded that there was no need for such a
provision. The experience of the district court planning groups
would have indicated that present court calendars generally are so
severely crowded that the actual danger is in the cases that take
too long before they are tried. The planning groups probably would
have responded that if a case ever arose in which the Government
or the court was pushing for an extremely swift trial, the defen-
dant's sixth amendment rights to adequate representation0 8 and
the statutory ends of justice exclusion 0 9 would adequately protect
the defendant.
The thirty-day minimum to trial provision is a solution to an
imaginary problem; discerning how the policy of preventing hasty
trials should affect specific determinations therefore requires spec-
ulation. Although the applicability of the excludable time provi-
sions to the thirty-day minimum to trial period might appear to
further the policies underlying the amendment, the opposite con-
clusion is also plausible.
The argument that excludable time should not apply to the
thirty-day period centers on the premise that thirty calendar days
sufficiently guarantees that a defendant is not being "railroaded"
to trial. 10 The logic underlying this argument can be questioned,
however, by hypothesizing a situation in which the defendant is
sent out of the district for psychiatric testing, thereby being sepa-
rated from his or her lawyer, for twenty-eight days. A rule of thirty
calendar days would not sufficiently guarantee that the lawyer
would be adequately prepared for trial. If the thirty-day period
excluded the psychiatric examination time under section
3161(h)(1)(A), 1 however, the lawyer would have another twenty-
eight days, not two days, to prepare for trial. If, for example, a
lawyer spent three weeks preparing a motion for a change of venue
107. See notes 58-62 & accompanying text supra.
108. See note 80 supra.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
110. See notes 58-62 & accompanying text supra.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (Supp. M 1979).
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based on pretrial publicity, a rule of thirty calendar days would
give the lawyer only nine days to prepare for a trial on the merits.
If the three weeks were excludable time under section
3161(h)(1)(F), 112 however, the lawyer would have a full thirty days
of preparation time. On the other hand, the ends of justice exclu-
sion11 coupled with the independent sixth amendment right to ad-
equate representation by counsel 14 would guarantee sufficient
preparation time in these situations. If counsel can rely upon the
ends of justice provision in these instances, section 3161(c)(2)
would appear unnecessary. The policy analysis aids little in resolv-
ing the question.
This Article concludes that the excludable time provisions
should be inapplicable to section 3161(c)(2). The Act does not ex-
plicitly require the application of excludable time.115 Other than
the conclusory statement found only in the Senate Report,116 there
is no legislative history to support the application of the exclud-
able time provisions. The thirty-day minimum to trial provision
created a problem where none existed; appending excludable time
to the thirty-day minimum would merely create additional compli-
cations. If section 3161(h) is held inapplicable to section
3161(c)(2), the practical error foisted on the courts by Congress
would be minimized.
Excludable Time for Motions
The legislative history of the original Act demonstrates Con-
gress' recognition that the public interest in quickly trying criminal
defendants is often not protected by the participants in the crimi-
nal justice system.1 17 As Senator Ervin noted in his testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee:
There is no question in my mind that speedy trial will never be a
reality until Congress makes clear to all that it will no longer tol-
erate delay. Unfortunately, while it is in the public interest to
have speedy trials, the parties involved in the criminal process do
not feel any pressure to go to trial. The court, defendant, his at-
112. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
113. Id. § 3161(h)(8) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
114. See note 80 supra.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (Supp. 1I 1979).
116. See note 87 & accompanying text supra.
117. See S. RaP. No. 93-1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). See also Senate Hearings
1979, supra note 11, at 2.
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torney, and the prosecutor may have different reasons not to push
for trial, but they all have some reason. The overworked courts,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys depend on delay in order to
cope with their heavy caseloads. The end of one trial only means
the start of another. To them, there is little incentive to move
quickly in what they see as an unending series of cases. The de-
fendant, of course, is in no hurry for trial, because he wishes to
delay his day of reckoning as long as possible.' 18
This understanding of the competing interests surrounding the leg-
islative efforts to ensure the right to a speedy trial prompted Con-
gress to list those events that were acceptable reasons to delay
trial." 9 The only major discretionary delay allowed was that neces-
sary to promote the ends of justice.120 Even this delay, however,
required the court to state on the record its reasons why the ends
of justice were served by granting the delay and the court was
compelled to consider certain factors set forth in the Act in its rea-
soning."' The Act also stated explicitly that "[n]o continuance
. . . shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's
calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain availa-
ble witnesses on the part of the attorney for the Government."' 22
Despite this background, the 1979 amendments adopted by
Congress create a loophole that seriously undermines the Act's
purpose and, as a practical matter, could leave the setting of trial
times to the whims of the court, the prosecution, or the defense
counsel. The 1979 amendments, in contrast to the original Act, re-
quire that "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or
other prompt disposition of, such motion" 23 shall be excluded in
computing the time in which an information or indictment must be
filed or in which a trial must begin. The amended Act also retains
the following related provision regarding exclusion of time during
the period the motion is under advisement: "[d]elay reasonably
attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which
any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advise-
118. Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658, H.R. 773 & H.R. 4807,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1974).
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1976).
120. Id. § 3161(h)(8).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (Supp. III 1979).
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ment by the court [is excludable time]. 124 By joining these two
provisions, the Government or defense counsel may file motions
that toll the time, or the judge may take virtually any amount of
time in setting the motion for hearing or for taking the motion
under advisement. The only limitation on the judge is that the
hearing or disposition of the motion must be "prompt.' 1 25 The dis-
cretionary aspect of "promptness" returns to the criminal process
the type of discretion Congress originally intended to limit in the
Act.
To ameliorate this situation, a time limit could be set on
"promptness" by defining time limits for setting hearings on crimi-
nal motions in the local speedy trial plan.126 In addition, the cir-
cuits could formulate guidelines to solve this problem, pursuant to
the new provisions of section 3166(f): "Each plan may be accom-
panied by guidelines promulgated by the judicial council of the cir-
cuit for use by all district courts within that circuit to implement
and secure compliance with this chapter."'127 This provision was in-
cluded as a result of the praise received by the Second Circuit
guidelines in congressional hearings. Other circuits, however, have
apparently decided not to follow the Second Circuit's lead in
promulgating circuit guidelines. 128 Because there is no indication
that Congress consulted the district courts in making the time
needed for motions excludable, it apparently again ignored the
planning process, just as it had done in drafting the thirty-day
minimum to trial provision. The final major amendment, delay of
the sanctions for one year, shows this same neglect of the planning
process.
Delay of Sanctions
The major criticism levied against the planning process was
that its success depended upon whether the courts would act to
hasten the criminal process although neither sanctions nor rewards
124. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(J).
125. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
126. In the Ninth Circuit at least, no district courts have taken this approach. Tele-
phone conversation with Richard Wieking, Assistant to the Circuit Executive for the Ninth
Circuit (June 6, 1980).'
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3166(f) (Supp. III 1979).
128. Telephone conversation with Richard Wieking, Assistant to the Circuit Executive
for the Ninth Circuit (June 6, 1980).
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were provided for doing So. 129 Consequently, in many districts dur-
ing the phase-in period, judges were making few excludable time
determinations because there were no penalties for failure to do
so.130 Speedy trial data, therefore, was always suspect because
there could be no assumption that all of the available excludable
time determinations were made and recorded by the court.131
The experience of many district courts contradicts the under-
lying premise for delaying the sanctions for one year-that the dis-
tricts would be better prepared at a later date for full implementa-
tion of the Act. When sanctions are not in force, many courts will
refuse to make excludable time determinations. Congress received
this advice during the hearings,3 2 but ignored it. One witness
before the House Subcommittee testified that delay could be justi-
fied, but only by the need for time to fill the additional judgeships
authorized by the Omnibus Judgeship Act.133 If there were to be a
delay of the sanctions, the witness argued, it should be linked
directly to the staffing of the new judgeships. 34 This approach was
not followed.
Sanctions were delayed, contrary to the experience of the dis-
trict court planning groups, because of the pressure exerted by
those groups that in the past were opposed to any speedy trial leg-
islation at all. A cynic would conclude that those groups wished to
delay that which they could not suppress, hoping that at a subse-
quent time they could make the Act permanently disappear.113
Conclusion
The 1979 amendments to the Speedy Trial Act will permit the
very evils the Act originally sought to avoid and the amendments
129. See Misner, District Court Compliance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974: The
Ninth Circuit Experience, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 15-27.
130. Id. See also Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 90-91.
131. See Senate Hearings 1979, supra note 11, at 90-91; Misner, District Court Com-
pliance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974: The Ninth Circuit Experience, 1977 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 1, 15-27.
132. See H.R. REP. No. 96-390, supra note 56, at 8.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id.
135. For a discussion of the reactions of the judges, the prosecutors, and defense coun-
sel to the Act, see Misner, Delay, Documentation and the Speedy Trial Act, 70 J. CRIM. L.
& C. 214 (1979).
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are so confusing"'8 that an outbreak of litigation concerning the
interpretation and applicability of their terms is to be expected.
The frailties of the amendments are the direct result of Congress'
bypass of the planning process that it created in the original Act.
Unless the local district court planning process is used, future
amendments to the Act, and the Act itself, may well become ill-
suited to the practical issues of case management facing the federal
district courts.
136. The confusing nature of the amendments can be seen in the action taken by the
local planning groups in drafting the local speedy trial plans. In the District of Arizona, the
vote was unanimous not to have excludable time apply to the minimum 30-day period to
trial. Letter from Robert L. Misner, Speedy Trial Reporter for the District of Arizona, to
Judge Robert F. Peckham (Feb. 5, 1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). In the
Southern District of California, the vote was 7-2 not to have excludable time apply. Letter
from Robert L. Misner, Speedy Trial Reporter for the Southern District of California, to
Judge Robert F. Peckham (Feb. 5, 1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). In the
District of Oregon, the planning group divided evenly on the issue. Letter of Charles W.
Carnese, Speedy Trial Reporter for the District of Oregon, to Richard Wieking (Mar. 21,
1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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